Key takeaways
This decision marks the first contested application of, and court-ordered remedy under, the amended misuse of market power provisions introduced in 2017.
The Federal Court’s orders against Apple represent a significant competition law intervention. This is the first time an Australian court has grappled with a pricing remedy for access under the misuse of market power prohibition on the application by a private party. We now have jurisprudence in Australia on a number of complex questions involving the approach to damages and pricing in unilateral conduct cases, setting a potentially important precedent for other privately litigated section 46 cases involving pricing that remain before the courts.
The orders also establish an important precedent for competition law remedies addressing digital platforms, indicating that ex post behavioural remedies can provide an effective response in private actions. This is in circumstances where regulators and governments worldwide are increasingly implementing ex ante regulation targeted at digital platforms. The orders are extensive and require Apple to remove restrictions on developers’ use of alternative payment methods in order to facilitate greater competition in the Australian app ecosystem.
Practically, Apple will need to implement technical and commercial changes to its App Store arrangements, potentially reducing developers’ reliance on Apple’s payment infrastructure and increasing consumer choice.
The injunctions are geographically confined to the Australian App Store and Australian Apple account holders, although they benefit eligible developers and alternative payment providers located overseas.
The orders impose ongoing, enforceable obligations without a sunset provision, although Apple may apply to vary or discharge them under s 80(3) of the CCA if circumstances materially change.
Introduction
On 22 October 2026, the Federal Court of Australia (Justice Beach) delivered judgment in relation to the remedies sought by Epic and arising from its claims against Apple. Beach J had previously found that Apple had contravened section 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) by restricting the use of alternative app distribution methods and in-app payment methods on an Apple or Android mobile device.
The Epic judgment was the first time liability had been determined under the amended section 46. This is also the first time remedies have been ordered under the new provision. The judgment is also significant because it is the first time an Australian court has issued a remedy dealing with access pricing for access to a platform or essential facility under section 46, including prior to its amendment in 2017. Section 46 (misuse of market power) cases are rarely commenced and litigated through to trial. Behavioural remedies are also rarely ordered by Australian courts under competition law.
Justice Beach largely granted Epic the relief it requested, declaring contraventions of competition law and imposing injunctions requiring Apple to remove restrictions on alternative payment methods and implement associated technical and commercial changes in the Australian App Store.
The judgment prohibits Apple from charging fees for access to alternative app distribution channels, anti-competitive fees for necessary tools and application programming interfaces (APIs), and fees on certain transactions using alternative payment methods. For apps distributed through an alternative channel (including in-app purchases), the Court capped fees to the equivalent of the fees imposed on app developers who distribute iOS apps via the Apple App Store, plus any “additional economic costs genuinely and reasonably incurred by Apple” in handling the transaction over an alternative payment method, rather than the IAP.
This is the first time that an economic test for reasonableness has been imposed as an injunctive remedy in a section 46 case in Australia. The formulation was challenged by Apple as being uncertain. However, Justice Beach responded, “[T]he phrase “economic costs that are genuinely and reasonably incurred” is readily understood. It refers to costs that Apple genuinely and reasonably incurs when iOS apps are distributed via the App Store using payment methods other than IAP, that is, distribution costs. Apple is a sophisticated company. What is required of Apple to comply with proposed order 10(e)(ii) is clear.”
The judgment also requires Apple to enable developers and users to access alternative iOS app distribution channels, including third-party app stores and direct downloads, and to provide the necessary tools and APIs on substantially equivalent terms to those available through the App Store. As well as requiring Apple to provide access, the remedies explicitly require Apple not to impose “frictions or impediments” to the discovery by customers of iOS apps distributed through third-party channels.
Importantly, the Court rejected Epic’s proposed contractual relief under s 87 of the CCA and limited the injunctions to the Australian App Store and users with Australian Apple accounts. Epic’s application for any orders to take effect on customers and developers outside Australia was rejected.
Background
As we reported here, on 12 August 2025, the Federal Court of Australia found Apple and Google engaged in a misuse of market power in breach of section 46 of the CCA by restricting the use of alternative app distribution methods and in-app payment methods on an Apple or Android mobile device since 2017. Similar findings were made in two related class actions. However, the Court did not accept the other claims of contravention of section 47 (exclusive dealing), section 45 (anti-competitive agreements) or unconscionable conduct allegations.
Epic Games commenced proceedings seeking declarations of contravention, injunctions to remove anti-competitive restrictions, orders permitting third-party app stores and alternative payment processors and damages for losses suffered due to the alleged conduct.
On 2 September 2026, the ACCC granted authorisation for Google and Epic to give effect to certain terms of a settlement reached by the parties to resolve the litigation between them in Australia. The ACCC authorised provisions of the settlement between Epic and Google that cap or restrict Google Play service fees for certain transactions, permit developers to offer alternative payment options alongside Google Play Billing (including external payment links), and establish associated implementation requirements in Australia.
The remedies ordered against Apple
In relation to Epic’s case against Apple, the Court largely made the orders sought by Epic except in relation to the relief sought under section 87 and the geographic scope of the injunctions sought by Epic:
01 Declaration: The Court largely accepted Epic’s formulation of the declaration of contravention which embodied the principal liability findings; the declaration is not limited to the location of users or the geographic region of the App Store. It declared that Apple contravened section 46 of the CCA by restricting alternative iOS app distribution and requiring developers to use Apple's in-app payment system (IAP), thereby substantially lessening competition in the relevant markets.
02 Reinstatement of Epic apps: The Court made Epic’s proposed order concerning the admission or re-admission of Fortnite or others into the App Store, but only in respect of the Australian App Store. This requires Apple, upon written application, to admit or readmit Fortnite and other Epic-developed apps to the Australian App Store, subject to compliance with applicable contractual requirements.
Apple must provide necessary developer tools and APIs on substantially the same terms as other developers.
03 Alternative distribution: The Court largely made Epic’s proposed injunctions, with important qualifications – they are only imposed on Apple concerning the Australian App Store and users with an Australian Apple account, but as for developers, they can be in Australia or elsewhere so long as they are current members of the developer program.
Alternative payment providers can be anywhere. The orders require Apple to enable users to obtain and update iOS apps, including alternative app stores, through channels other than the App Store, subject to security scanning and notarisation. Apple must provide developers with necessary tools and APIs on substantially equivalent terms.
04 Prohibition on obstructing distribution: This prohibits Apple from preventing or hindering alternative app distribution, including through fees, conditions, technical restrictions or restrictions on developers distributing through competing channels.
05 Restrictions on access fees and conditions: This prohibits fees or conditions for access to, or use of, alternative distribution channels, and anti-competitive fees or conditions for necessary tools and APIs that hinder alternative distribution, including fees higher or conditions more onerous than those applying to free or advertising-funded apps distributed through the App Store. It also prevents Apple from restricting lower prices through alternative channels, requiring IAP or imposing certain contractual restrictions.
06 Alternative payment methods: This prohibits Apple from requiring IAP for in-app digital purchases, preventing developers from directing users to alternative payment methods, or hindering the use of alternative payment solutions.
07 Security requirements: This permits necessary and proportionate security requirements for alternative payment methods only where Apple first provides reasonable written notice explaining the additional security risk and proposed requirements.
08 Positive obligation to permit alternative payments: This requires Apple to enable developers to use payment methods other than IAP and to direct users to those methods, subject to the permitted security requirements.
09 Restrictions on payment-related fees and conditions: This prohibits Apple from requiring price parity with IAP, transaction reporting or audit rights, or the simultaneous offering of IAP. It also prohibits certain fees on external transactions and limits the fees Apple can charge in connection with digital-content purchases using alternative payment methods in App Store-distributed apps, by reference to the equivalent fees levied on developers on purchases handled through the App Store, plus any “genuinely and reasonably incurred additional economic costs incurred by Apple” in connection with the use of a third-party payment method, rather than IAP.
10 Restrictions on payment-related impediments: This prohibits additional “friction” when users select alternative payment methods and certain fees or conditions for accessing tools and APIs needed to enable those methods.
11 Non-discrimination: This prohibits Apple from rejecting, discriminating against or retaliating against developers or apps because they use alternative distribution channels or payment methods.
12–13 Commencement: Orders 3–11 commence at noon (Melbourne time) on 1 March 2027, subject to a possible extension to 3 May 2027 if Apple successfully applies within the prescribed window.
14–16 Costs and procedural matters: Apple must pay 85% of Epic's costs up to and including the liability trial. Costs of the relief hearing are reserved, and liberty to apply is granted. Beach J suggested dealing with this in the same way, as Epic had been substantially successful except the Court did not grant any s 87 relief and did not accept the geographic scope of the prohibitory and mandatory injunctions sought by Epic (having accepted Apple’s argument about limiting this to Australian consumers / customers – a discount afforded in acknowledgement of this acceptance).
Beach J also specified that the injunctions will continue indefinitely (i.e., they have no sunset provision). However, Apple will have the capacity under section 80(3) of the CCA to apply to vary or discharge the injunctions if there are material changes in circumstances.
The Federal Court’s judgment and reasons
The judgment, orders and reasons are set out in Epic Games Inc v Apple Inc (No 2) [2026] FCA 1552 (Epic remedies judgment) and Anthony v Apple Inc (No 2) [2026] FCA 1553 (class action remedies judgment). In the Epic remedies judgment, Beach J explained the reasons for and parameters of the orders as follows:
The Court’s approach to determining relief
Beach J made extensive declaratory and injunctive orders, finding that s 80 of the CCA conferred a broad remedial power, beyond simply restraining the exact contravening conduct or similar conduct. At [110]-[154] of the Epic remedies judgment, his Honour explained that the Court can impose injunctions that restrain otherwise lawful conduct if it has a sufficient connection with addressing the harmful effects of the contravention. At [951], Beach J emphasised that:
“s 80 is essentially a public interest provision directed to upholding the competition norms in Pt IV. It confers a broad power to make orders that are appropriate to prevent, restrain or remedy contraventions and their effects. Opening the distribution and payments markets to effective competition in the wake of a s 46 contravention is not some free-floating policy objective. It is the direct way in which the contravention and its effects are prevented, restrained and remedied, and as such it is fully authorised by s 80.”
Given Apple’s use of interlocking contractual and technical restrictions, the Court considered it was necessary to impose an order that restores effective competition by forcing the market open and preventing the same harm recurring by other means. Beach J reinforced at [142] that:
“[W]here the contravening conduct has been implemented through a web of interlocking contractual and technical measures that foreclose markets, it may be both necessary and appropriate to grant an order that remedies the contravening conduct and its effects by prising open the market to competition, and which prevents the recurrence of the same substantial lessening of competition by different means.”
Pricing and payment term orders
This is the first time an Australian court has issued a remedy dealing with access pricing for access to a platform or essential facility under section 46. The Court considered that permitting alternative distribution and payment methods would be ineffective if Apple could impose charges that made those alternatives commercially unviable. Beach J provided the following reasons for imposing the pricing orders:
- No channel-specific fees on alternative distribution (order 5(a)): Order 5(a) reflects his Honour’s finding that Apple imposes technical restrictions, encoded in iOS, that mean only native apps from the App Store may be installed on an iOS device, apart from certain trivial exceptions. As Apple provides no distribution service for an app distributed through an alternative channel, it is reasonable to infer that any fee for using such a channel would more likely than not be designed to protect Apple's dominance. The orders target European Union-style charges such as the per-download core technology fee, which Beach J found were designed to dissuade developers.
- Non-discrimination on tool fees (order 5(b)): Beach J reasoned that this order is a non-discrimination safeguard, not a fee cap or compulsory fee on developers. The order prevents Apple from imposing additional or more onerous fees on alternative distribution channels by reason of their use of those channels, and in so doing, prevents Apple from giving preference to distribution through the App Store.
- No fee on alternative channel payments (order 9(d)): Given that Apple does not provide distribution or payment services to developers who distribute iOS apps via alternative distribution channels, or who distribute apps through channels including the App Store, but who happen to sell digital content on a website or through their own platform for use in-app, the imposition of such fees could only be directed to dissuading such developers from using alternative payment methods.
- Fee cap for App Store apps (order 9(e)): This order limits the fees Apple can charge in connection with digital-content purchases using alternative payment methods in App Store-distributed apps, by reference to fees charged on app developers that distribute through the App Store plus any additional economic costs genuinely and reasonably incurred by Apple in handling a transaction initiated over the third-party payment method. In response to Apple’s complaint that the order lacks clarity and certainty, Beach J held, at [885]:
“[T]he phrase “economic costs that are genuinely and reasonably incurred” is readily understood. It refers to costs that Apple genuinely and reasonably incurs when iOS apps are distributed via the App Store using payment methods other than IAP, that is, distribution costs. Apple is a sophisticated company. What is required of Apple to comply with proposed order 10(e)(ii) is clear.”
- No fees for access to tools or APIs necessary to enable alternative payment methods where those do not apply to comparable apps selling physical goods or services (order 10(b)): Apple failed to explain why security requires frictions for digital purchases but not for physical ones. Beach J considered that charging more for digital purchases than for physical goods, which currently attract no fee, can only be explained as a way of imposing the payments tie. Beach J held that it was appropriate to enjoin Apple from such conduct because “[t]he only explanation for such price discrimination is that it is a means of imposing the anti-competitive payments tie on those developers who offer in-app purchases of digital content, by financially dissuading them from offering a payment solution other than IAP” [879].
Access and alternative app distribution orders
Beach J rejected Apple's proposed approach of merely prohibiting “unreasonable” interference, as that would leave Apple substantial discretion, effectively perpetuating its market power. The access orders were designed to ensure genuine competitive entry, including by preventing Apple from imposing exclusionary fees, onerous conditions or technical impediments. Apple retained the ability to license its intellectual property (IP) and receive lawful remuneration, and alternative apps remained subject to an automated scan for genuine security and/or privacy reasons and notarisation by Apple or a suitably qualified third party.
His Honour also emphasised, at [343], that Apple’s IP rights are not a shield against competition law and do not immunise its conduct from the operation of section 46 or appropriate remedies for such a contravention. Orders requiring access to technology were permissible under section 80.
Geographic scope and safeguards
Although Beach J accepted that section 80 was capable of supporting orders with extraterritorial consequences, he declined to grant the worldwide relief sought by Epic, accepting Apple’s arguments that global relief could interfere with the balances struck by regulators in the United States, European Union and Japan.
Accordingly, the Court confined the injunctions to the Australian App Store and users with Australian Apple Accounts, although developers and alternative payment providers globally can still benefit from the Australian orders and the declaration itself is not geographically limited.
Class action orders and limits on overcharge findings
In the class action remedies judgment, Beach J adopted common questions and answers recording the findings of contravention in the Apple and Google class actions, making them binding on non-opt-out group members under section 33ZB of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Beach J preferred precise formulations that identified the conduct and defined the scope of the resulting statutory estoppel. His Honour declined to make a binding common finding that developers had paid materially inflated commissions.
The existence and extent of individual overcharges remain unresolved and cannot be properly determined through a generalised binding answer because actual commissions varied between developers, apps and periods, and some developers paid no commission. Although Beach J had previously expressed the preliminary view that commissions would likely have been materially lower absent the contraventions, he had not determined that any particular developer had suffered an overcharge, or quantified the counterfactual commission rates.
How the orders against Apple compare with the Google-Epic ACCC authorisation and settlement
The Federal Court’s decision comes only weeks after the ACCC authorised a settlement of the parallel matter involving Epic and Google on 2 September 2026.
The Federal Court’s orders against Apple differ in operation and geographic scope compared with the ACCC’s authorisation of the Google-Epic settlement. While they both seek to promote competition in mobile app ecosystems by facilitating developers’ use of alternative payment methods, the Apple orders regulate the permissibility of access fees and conditions, whereas the Google–Epic authorisation permits a negotiated framework containing specified pricing limits. The Apple orders:
- require access to alternative app distribution channels and payment methods;
- prohibit certain access and transaction fees; and
- restrict fees or conditions that hinder competition, without prescribing general percentage-based fee caps.
In contrast, the Google–Epic authorisation exempts from the prohibitions of the competition law specified settlement arrangements, including service fee caps and alternative payment arrangements, rather than imposing court-ordered obligations. The ACCC authorised, for six years, provisions of the settlement between Epic and Google that cap or restrict Google Play service fees for certain transactions, permit developers to offer alternative payment options alongside Google Play Billing (including external payment links), and establish associated implementation requirements in Australia.
How this compares and interacts with overseas remedies or rules
The Australian proceedings form part of a broader global campaign by Epic to challenge the app store practices of Apple and Google. The Federal Court’s orders against Apple broadly align with the following developments aimed at reducing restrictions on alternative payment methods and promoting competition in mobile app ecosystems:
- United States: Epic’s litigation against Apple remains ongoing, with the courts rejecting Epic’s federal monopolisation claims but finding Apple’s anti-steering restrictions unlawful, and a further appeal concerning Apple’s compliance with the resulting injunction now before the US Supreme Court. Meanwhile, Epic successfully established that Google unlawfully monopolised Android app distribution and in-app payments, with the judgment upheld on appeal and remedies being implemented following the dismissal of Google’s Supreme Court petition and withdrawal of the parties’ proposed injunction modifications in 2026. The Australian orders against Apple broadly mirror the anti-steering relief imposed against Apple, although the US remedies impose more explicit restrictions on commissions, while the separate Google litigation has resulted in broader remedies addressing app distribution and payment systems. Beach J also held his approach consistent with the US Ninth Circuit's guidance in the US Epic litigation that Apple may charge only its necessary costs for linked-out purchases.
- European Union: While Epic has not brought formal lawsuits against Apple or Google in the European Union, it has publicly challenged Google’s practices and made complaints to European regulators about Apple. On 23 July 2026, the European Commission issued two significant non-compliance decisions under the Digital Markets Act (DMA). The DMA is a relatively new regulation that imposes obligations and restrictions on large technology companies designated as “gatekeepers” to prevent anti-competitive practices and improve market access for smaller businesses. The Commission issued Google a fine of €460 million for self-preferencing its own services on Google Search and a fine of €430 million for putting in place restrictions on businesses to direct consumers to alternative, often cheaper, purchase channels on Google Play (steering). The Google Play decision is particularly relevant to the Epic litigation because the Commission found that Google had restricted developers’ ability to inform users about alternative purchasing options, direct them to those options and conclude transactions outside Google Play. The Commission ordered Google to end the non-compliant conduct and comply within 60 days, warning that continued non-compliance could expose it to periodic penalty payments of up to 5% of average daily worldwide turnover.
The Federal Court’s orders against Apple in Australia pursue similar objectives, particularly in prohibiting restrictions on developers directing consumers to alternative purchasing channels, although the EU regime operates through ex ante regulatory obligations rather than judicial remedies following competition law contraventions.
- United Kingdom: Epic had commenced proceedings against Google, alleging that Google abused its dominance in mobile operating systems, app distribution and payment services, with the case now combined with related class action claims. However, on 9 March 2026, the UK’s Competition Appeal Tribunal made a consent order formally terminating the proceedings after Epic and Google reached a settlement, the terms of which have not publicly been disclosed. This withdrawal occurred around the same time as a broader settlement between Epic and Google in March 2026 covering other jurisdictions, including Australia as summarised above. Separately, in September 2026, the Competition Appeal Tribunal approved a £260 million settlement of a collective competition claim brought on behalf of UK Android app developers against Google. This is the largest settlement approved for distribution to class members under the UK’s collective competition proceedings regime to date. However, the Tribunal did not determine whether Google had contravened competition law; it approved the negotiated settlement as just and reasonable, without any admission or finding of liability.
- Japan: In Japan, Apple is required to permit alternative app marketplaces, on specified conditions and on terms that permit Apple to apply various security and privacy protections but is not required to permit and does not permit web distribution. Beach J expressly considered Japan’s regulatory regime and limited the Australian injunctions to the Australian App Store and users with Australian Apple Accounts to avoid interfering with Japan’s distinct regulatory requirements. The Australian orders operate alongside Japan’s regime, while imposing more prescriptive obligations on Apple concerning access, fees and alternative payment methods for Australian users.
Collectively, these developments signal increasing international scrutiny of app store restrictions, with the Australian orders against Apple contributing to a broader shift towards greater developer choice and payment competition, and potentially influencing Apple's global compliance strategies and future litigation.
Next steps
Apple has indicated that it will apply for a stay and file an appeal. On 23 October 2026, the Court ordered a limited stay of the orders pending a hearing on the stay.
Watch this space!