On 23 July 2025, the International Court of Justice (ICJ, or Court) delivered its highly anticipated advisory opinion on Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (Advisory Opinion), marking a turning point for international climate law. Delivered by a unanimous Court, the Advisory Opinion clarified the sources of and interactions between international law governing climate change, finding that States’ obligations concerning the protection of the climate system and other parts of the environment from anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, in particular the obligation to prevent significant transboundary harm under customary international law, are obligations owed erga omnes (to the international community as a whole). The Advisory Opinion also addresses key questions of State responsibility stemming from distinctive aspects of climate change, concluding that a breach of identified obligations may constitute an “internationally wrongful act”, entailing legal consequences for that State under international law.

The Court’s conclusions are significant for States, corporations, individuals and the environment, with the findings anticipated to be picked up in other courts, parliaments and boardrooms globally as authoritative guidance. The Advisory Opinion is the third and final in a trifecta of landmark climate change advisory opinions (following the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in May 2024 (read more here) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in July (read more here), which each clarified the legal responsibilities of States in the context of climate change.

Below, we set out our key takeaways from the Advisory Opinion, followed by an analysis of the Court’s conclusions and its significance for States, private actors and individuals, and for global economic and political relationships. These are particularly timely considerations, with the 30th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 30) taking place in Belem, Brazil, later this year and States simultaneously required to submit their latest (and more ambitious) Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement.

Key takeaways

  • Acceptance of the best available science: in acknowledging the severe and far-reaching consequences of climate change, the Court relied upon the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as constituting the “best available science on the causes, nature and consequences of climate change”: at [74],[284].

  • Applicable law (rejection of lex specialis): the Court held that the “most directly relevant applicable law governing the question[s] of which it [has been] seised” is not confined to the climate change treaty framework (i.e. the Paris Agreement), including by reason of the interpretative principle of lex specialis: at [114]. Instead, the ICJ affirmed that the entire body of international law, including customary international law, environmental law and human rights law, imposes relevant obligations on States, such that even where States are not party to the Paris Agreement, they can still be held accountable under international law for failing to prevent significant harm to the climate system: at [411]-[412].

  • Duty to prevent significant harm and co-operate: States have duties under customary international law to prevent significant harm to the climate system and other parts of the environment, which involves the obligation to undertake “stringent” due diligence and to co-operate in good faith with other States. The conduct required by the duty of due diligence includes States taking, to the best of their ability, precautionary measures, undertaking risk assessments and co-operating with other States. These duties apply universally, not just to States party to the climate change treaty framework and require States to set science-based climate targets and ensure a “certain level of vigilance” in the regulation of public and private actions that contribute to climate change: at [132]-[139].

  • Obligation to prepare and maintain ambitious NDCs: States have a legally binding obligation to prepare, communicate and maintain NDCs under the Paris Agreement, which must represent their “highest possible ambition” (read in the context of States Parties’ “scientifically based consensus target under the Paris Agreement” of 1.5°C): at [235]-[254].

  • Responsibility for climate harm: while climate harm results from the culmination of actions from various States, the Court held that any State can be held individually responsible for breaches of their obligations under international law in respect of climate change (i.e. a failure to exercise due diligence when granting fossil fuel subsidies that result in significant GHG emissions). Notably, the Court rejected States’ submissions concerning purported difficulties in determining each State’s contribution to global emissions, concluding that “while climate change is caused by cumulative GHG emissions, it is scientifically possible to determine each State’s total contribution to global emissions, taking into account both historical and current emissions” and “where several States are responsible for the same internationally wrongful act, the responsibility of each State may be invoked in relation to that act”: at [429],[431].

  • State liability for private actors: States may be legally responsible for failing to conduct adequate due diligence and regulate the activities of private actors whose emissions contribute to significant harm to the climate system. The Court suggested, by example, that providing fossil fuel subsidies where a State has “failed to exercise due diligence by not taking the necessary regulatory and legislative measures to limit the quantity of emissions caused by private actors under its jurisdiction” may amount to an internationally wrongful act: at [427]-[432].

  • Legal consequences for breaches: the Court affirmed that States responsible for climate-related internationally wrongful acts, which have caused harm or damage to another State, may be required to make full reparations to the injured State, including by way of restitution, compensation or satisfaction. In the climate context, restitution may take the form of reconstructing damaged or destroyed infrastructure and restoring ecosystems and biodiversity. If restitution is not possible, responsible States may have an obligation to compensate for losses incurred as a result of the international wrongful act: at [445]-[455].

  • Statehood of low-lying nations: the Court affirmed that, under the customary rules of international law, States at risk of losing their physical territory due to sea level rise, particularly Pacific and other small island developing States (SIDS), will not necessarily lose statehood even in the case of total disappearance of their territory. This conclusion (and the lack of reasoning provided by the Court) was critiqued in the separate Declaration of Judge Tomka, who asserted that the Court “could have taken a more prudent approach” and avoided espousing so directly on the applicability of the classical notion of statehood under the Montevideo Convention.

Setting the scene: What is the ICJ and its advisory jurisdiction?

What is the International Court of Justice?

The ICJ is the primary judicial organ of the United Nations (UN). The ICJ’s role is to resolve, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorised UN organs and specialised agencies. Unlike specialist international courts and tribunals, the ICJ’s jurisdiction is general and it may entertain any question of international law duly referred to it.

What is an advisory opinion?

Advisory proceedings, as distinct from contentious proceedings, are where an international court or tribunal gives an opinion on legal questions referred to it by authorised bodies. The ICJ has jurisdiction to deliver an advisory opinion in response to a referral from the UN General Assembly (General Assembly), the UN Security Council or specialised UN agencies authorised by the General Assembly.

Upon receiving a request to give an advisory opinion, the Court will decide which States are likely to be able to furnish information on the question(s) submitted to the Court (see Court’s Order dated 25 April 2023). Those States will be invited to make written and oral statements on the question(s) put to the Court to help inform its conclusions, while other States and international organisations, who may consider that they are able to furnish relevant information to the Court, must submit a request for the Court’s approval. Although advisory opinions are not legally binding on States, they carry significant persuasive authority in interpreting international instruments and States’ obligations under international law. The clarity and certainty they offer can also provide encouragement for States contemplating interstate dispute resolution.

Initiating the Advisory Opinion

Questions put forward

On 29 March 2023, the General Assembly adopted resolution 77/276, which requested an advisory opinion from the ICJ on States’ obligations under international law in respect of climate change. The two specific questions put before the Court for its consideration were:

"Having particular regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Paris Agreement, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the duty of due diligence, the rights recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the principle of prevention of significant harm to the environment and the duty to protect and preserve the marine environment,

  1. What are the obligations of States under international law to ensure the protection of the climate system and other parts of the environment from anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases for States and for present and future generations?

  2. What are the legal consequences under these obligations for States where they, by their acts and omissions, have caused significant harm to the climate system and other parts of the environment, with respect to:

    • States, including, in particular, small island developing States, which due to their geographical circumstances and level of development, are injured or specially affected by or are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change?

    • Peoples and individuals of the present and future generations affected by the adverse effects of climate change?”

Key arguments made by parties

Participation in the ICJ Advisory Opinion proceedings reflects the highest level of engagement in any advisory proceeding in history, with 96 States and 11 international organisations participating in the public hearings held from 2 to 13 December 2024. While the ICJ received varying submissions from States and international organisations, there were broadly three groups of argument.

Hard-line against expansive reading of climate obligations

  • Climate change treaty framework: the climate change treaty framework, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Paris Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol, is lex specialis and constitutes the entirety of States’ climate-related obligations. Other treaties or customary international law are not relevant to a States’ climate change-related obligations.

  • Human rights: there are no specific obligations on States, as arising under existing human rights treaties, to ensure the protection of the climate system.

  • State responsibility: States are not responsible for past emissions, either due to difficulties in establishing causation (as submitted by Australia) or because GHG emissions were not historically considered wrongful acts (as argued by the USA and Russia). Instead, these States (generally, historically high-emitting States) advocated for addressing climate harm through existing climate framework mechanisms, such as the voluntary Loss and Damage Fund.

Middle position

  • Climate change treaty framework: the climate change treaty framework is not lex specialis and may be informed by, or interpretated consistently with, other directly relevant treaties or rules of customary international law.

  • State responsibility: in general, most States agreed on the applicability of the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC), which asserts that while all States have a duty to combat climate change, the greater capabilities of developed States entails a greater responsibility to implement measures in response to climate change.

Expansive interpretation of climate obligations

  • Climate change treaty framework: the climate change framework is not lex specialis and should be interpreted to promote the systemic integration of States’s obligations across all areas of international law.

  • (Prohibition on transboundary harm: obligations, including the prohibition on transboundary harm and the precautionary principle, apply under customary international law and are obligations erga omnes (owed to the international community as a whole).

  • Human rights: some States advocated for expansive human rights obligations, specifically regarding climate-induced displacement and territorial loss due to rising sea levels, as highlighted by the submissions of Jamaica, Vanuatu and Bangladesh. Most developing States called for financial and non-financial assistance from developed nations, including debt cancellation (Kenya) and technical support (Papua New Guinea and Burkina Faso).

  • State responsibility: States vulnerable to climate change, particularly SIDS and LDCs, argued for individual State responsibility reflecting both the historical and contemporary contributions of States (particularly high-emitting States) to global GHG emissions.

The ICJ’s findings

The ICJ affirmed that the following climate change treaties impose binding obligations on States to ensure the protection of the climate system and other parts of the environment from anthropogenic GHG emissions:

UNFCCC

  • States parties to the UNFCCC have an obligation to adopt measures with a view to contributing to the mitigation of GHG emissions and adaptation to climate change

  • States parties listed in Annex I to the UNFCCC have additional obligations to take the lead in combating climate change by limiting their GHG emissions and enhancing their GHG sinks and reservoirs

  • States parties to the UNFCCC have a duty to co-operate in good faith with each other in order to achieve the underlying objective of the UNFCCC, including regarding the development of technologies, practices and processes that reduce anthropogenic emissions of GHG emissions. Consistent with the findings of ITLOS, the ICJ reasoned that “international co-operation is indispensable in the field of climate change”: at [215]

Kyoto Protocol

  • States parties to the Kyoto Protocol must comply with applicable provisions of the Protocol, including emissions reductions commitments. While there is no active commitment period at present, the ICJ confirmed that the treaty remains in force and relevant, including as a means for assessing the compliance of parties with their commitments during the first commitment period: at [269]

Paris Agreement

  • States parties to the Paris Agreement have an obligation to act with due diligence in taking measures in accordance with their CBDR-RC capable of making an adequate contribution to achieving the temperature goal set out in the Agreement

  • States parties to the Paris Agreement have an obligation to prepare, communicate and maintain successive and progressive NDCs which when taken together, are capable of achieving the primary temperature goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. States do not enjoy “unfettered discretion” in the preparation of their NDCs. NDCs must be prepared applying a “stringent” standard of due diligence and represent the “highest possible ambition”. The mere formal preparation, communication and maintenance of successive NDCs is not sufficient for compliance: at [252],[270]

  • States parties to the Paris Agreement have an obligation to pursue domestic mitigation measures reflecting best efforts and employing all means at their disposal, to achieve the objectives set out in their successive NDCs. These measures may include putting in place a national system, including legislation, administrative procedures and an enforcement mechanism and exercising adequate vigilance to make such a system function effectively, with a view to achieving the objectives in their NDCs: at [253]

  • States parties to the Paris Agreement have obligations of adaptation and co-operation, including through technology and financial transfers, which must be performed in good faith. Under the UNFCCC and based on the principle of CBDR-RC, all parties have an obligation to develop and report on national policies, programmes and measures to address climate change: at [256]-[268].

For obligations of conduct, such as the obligation to adopt mitigation measures and duty to co-operate in good faith, the ICJ determined that a State may act wrongfully if it fails to use all means at its disposal to bring about the objective envisaged under the obligation (subject to the principle of CBDR-RC). In the case of an obligation of result, such as the obligation to prepare, communicate and maintain successive and ambitious NDCs, a State may act wrongfully if it fails to bring about the result required under the obligation: at [208].

The Court affirmed that States have duties under customary international law to (a) prevent significant harm to the environment; and (b) co-operate for the protection of the environment.

In doing so, the ICJ reasoned that the rules or principles under customary international law (and other treaty rules) were not excluded by lex specialis – the interpretive principle that a more specific law overrides a more general law. Rather, the Court clarified that the object and purpose of the climate change treaties are not inconsistent with other rules or principles of international law and that even though the climate change treaties are the principal instruments addressing climate change, it does not follow that they displace other rules and principles of international law: at [169]-[171].

The ICJ affirmed that the duty to prevent significant harm to the environment applies to all global environmental concerns, including the climate system and consists of two main elements: (a) the harm to be prevented and (b) due diligence as the standard of conduct: at [134]. Whether an activity poses a risk of significant harm depends on both the likelihood and severity of harm, assessed with regard to current and future risks; the higher the probability and seriousness, the more demanding the required standard: at [275].

The Court confirmed that cumulative acts by States and private actors can amount to significant harm, and that the diffuse nature of climate change does not preclude the duty’s application, requiring coordinated and cooperative responses: at [275]-[279]. Citing Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), the ICJ reiterated that States must act with due diligence, using all means at their disposal to avoid activities within their jurisdiction causing significant environmental damage to other States: at [132].

In the climate context, due diligence requires States to adopt regulatory mitigation measures to achieve deep, rapid and sustained GHG reductions. This may be achieved through the regulation of both public and private conduct and effective enforcement and monitoring: at [282]. States must take precautionary measures based on scientific and technological information, relevant rules and international standards, with the standard varying according to each State’s capabilities. States are required to actively seek scientific information to assess risks, and where scientific evidence exists, the due diligence standard becomes more stringent for all States: at [283]. Where available technologies can address risks, States are expected to use them and current standards, including COP decisions and technical norms, must be considered in determining due diligence: at [286]-[287]. Other elements include undertaking risk assessments and notifying and consulting other States as appropriate: at [136].

The Court confirmed that the required level of due diligence is context-specific, with a “heightened degree of vigilance and prevention” required in the context of climate change: at [137]-[138]. Moreover, the due diligence standard evolves as States’ capacities increase: at [292].

In this context, the ICJ also emphasised the precautionary principle, which requires States to take positive action and not disregard plausible risks. States must conduct environmental impact assessments (EIAs) for significant activities contributing to GHG emissions, based on the best available science and tailored to the specific climate risk: at [297]-[298]. Appreciating the higher due diligence standard for climate system issues, any EIA for the purpose of preventing significant harm to the climate system needs to take the specific character of the respective risk into account.

Due diligence in preventing significant harm to the environment may also imply an obligation on States to notify and consult in good faith with other States with respect to risks of adverse effects of their conduct, which is particularly warranted when an activity significantly affects collective efforts to address harm to the climate system: at [299].

These findings are particularly relevant in light of the recent Australian Federal Court decision of Pabai v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2025] FCA 796, where the Court made factual observations regarding Australia’s 2030 target under the Paris Agreement, including that (at [478]):

“There is certainly no indication in the evidence that the [Australian Government’s UNFCCC] Taskforce or the relevant decision-makers in government, gave any, or any genuine, material or meaningful, consideration to the best available science concerning the calculation of CO2 budgets, both globally and among nations. If it was considered at all, which is highly doubtful, it was given no weight when determining the target.”

The ICJ also confirmed that all States have a duty to cooperate in good faith to protect the environment and “achieve concrete emission reduction targets”, having regard to CBDR-RC: at [305]. The Court observed that coordinated and collective efforts by States are required to achieve meaningful results in protecting the environment, with specific obligations arising under the climate change treaties and customary international law. In particular, the Paris Agreement establishes obligations of co-operation with respect to issues of adaption and loss and damage. Cooperation also derives from the principle that the conservation and management of shared resources and the environment are based on shared interests and governed by the principle of good faith: at [140]-[141], [260].

The Court noted that in the context of climate change, “[c]o-operation is not a matter of choice for States but a pressing need and a legal obligation”: at [308].

The principles of sustainable development, CBDR-RC, equity, intergenerational equity and the precautionary approach or principle were held by the Court as applicable guiding principles for the interpretation and application of the “most directly relevant” legal rules. These principles do not establish new obligations but are relevant for the interpretation of treaties and the determination of rules of customary law relating to the environment.

With respect to intergenerational equity, the Court acknowledged the differing views of States but affirmed that “its relevance for the obligations in respect of climate change is undisputable”: at [155]-[157].

While the ICJ also addressed the polluter pays principle (i.e., the polluter should bear the cost of pollution),acknowledging that some States have followed the principle in certain sector-specific treaties and national legislation, it reasoned that because the principle is not envisaged or reflected in any climate change treaties, nor does it apply directly in customary interstate relations it was not part of the applicable law for the purpose of the Advisory Opinion. However, the Court noted that this “does not preclude the possibility that forms of strict liability for hazardous acts and other kinds of acts that are not wrongful under international law are developing”: at [159].

The ICJ considered the applicability of obligations under other environmental treaties relevant to States’ responsibilities to protect the climate system, observing that existing ozone, ecosystem and desertification protection measures “simultaneously operate as climate change mitigation or adaptation measures” and inherently contribute to the protection of the climate system: at [324]-[334].

In doing so, the Court affirmed that States party to other environmental treaties, including the following, must conjunctively consider their obligations under climate change treaties and customary international law:

  • Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer

  • Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and its Kigali Amendment

  • Convention on Biological Diversity

  • United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa

  • United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

For States party to UNCLOS, the ICJ confirmed that States are under no obligation to update maritime charts, geological co-ordinates or maritime boundaries, established in accordance with UNCLOS, to reflect a States’ loss of physical territory due to sea level rise. Where there are sea level rises, potentially leading to the forced displacement of populations within their territory or across borders, this will not affect the territorial integrity of States and their permanent sovereignty over their natural resources: at [357],[362].

On the question of Statehood, the Court observed that, once a State is established, the disappearance of its physical territory would not necessarily entail the loss of its statehood: at [363]. This latter conclusion was critiqued in the separate Declaration of Judge Tomka, who asserted that the Court’s reasoning was ambiguous and that the Court “could have taken a more prudent approach” by not espousing so directly on the applicability of the classical notion of statehood under the Montevideo Convention.

The ICJ crystallised the interdependence between human rights and the protection of the environment that Special Rapporteur David Boyd has asserted for some time: the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment is an essential precondition for the enjoyment of other human rights: at [393].

The Court powerfully affirmed that under international human rights law, States are required to take necessary measures to protect the climate system and other parts of the environment to ensure the effective enjoyment of human rights. These measures may include, implementing mitigation and adaptation measures, with due account given to the protection of human rights, adopting appropriate standards and legislation and regulating the activities of the private sector: at [403].

The Court confirmed that States must consider their obligations under international human rights law when implementing their obligations under climate change treaties and customary international law, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and human rights recognised under customary international law (including the right to a healthy environment).

The ICJ did not seek to impose any territorial limits, or determine the responsibility of any particular State, but rather focused on determining the obligations of all States pertaining to the protection of the climate system and the legal consequences for States that fail to comply: at [96].

The Court rejected the proposition that the climate change treaty framework constitutes lex specialis in respect of State responsibility. While Article 8 of the Partis Agreement encourages parties to adopt a co-operative and facilitative approach with respect to loss and damage, it does not address issues of liability or compensation of parties for such loss and damage. Similarly, while the Paris Agreement Implementation and Compliance Committee established in Article 15 has the power to facilitate implementation of and promote compliance with the Agreement, this compliance mechanism does not have the power to settle disputes and provide for remedies and does not have the capacity to determine State responsibility: at [411]-[416].

The Court concluded that responsibility for breaches of obligations under the climate change treaties and in relation to the loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, is to be determined by applying the well-established rules on State responsibility under customary international law: at [420].

Responsibility and causation

The ICJ affirmed that State responsibility will turn on whether a State has taken “all measures which were within its power to prevent the significant harm” in question. A State that does not exercise sufficiently “stringent” due diligence in the performance of its obligation to prevent significant harm to the climate system and other elements of the environment, commits an internationally wrongful act entailing its responsibility: at [409].

The Court confirmed that “[f]or a finding of State responsibility, what is required is an internationally wrongful act and its attribution to a State, whether the act causes harm or not”: at [433].

Where there are several injured States, each injured State may separately invoke the responsibility of every State which has committed an internationally wrongful act resulting in damage to the climate system and other parts of the environment: at [431].

Responsibility for conduct of private actors

The Court observed that States have a responsibility to regulate the activities of private actors, echoing the observations of ITLOS that the “obligation of due diligence is particularly relevant in a situation in which the activities in question are mostly carried out by private persons or entities”: at [427]-[428].

Specifically, the Court noted that the following may constitute an internationally wrongful act attributable to a State:

  • the failure of a State to take appropriate action to protect the climate system from GHG emissions – including through fossil fuel production, fossil fuel consumption, the granting of fossil fuel exploration licences or the provision of fossil fuel subsidies; and

  • the failure to exercise due diligence by not taking the necessary regulatory and legislative measures to limit the quantity of emissions caused by private actors under its jurisdiction.

Legal consequences

The ICJ made the following observations with respect to possible legal consequences flowing from an internationally wrongful act in the context of climate change treaties:

  • Continuing duty of performance: any breach of a State of its international obligations does not extinguish its underlying duty of performance. If a State submits an inadequate NDC, a competent court or tribunal court may order that State to perform its obligations by adopting an NDC consistent with its obligations under the Paris Agreement: at [446].

  • Duty of cessation and guarantees of non-repetition: a State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to cease that act if it is continuing and if the breached obligation is still in force. This may require a State to “revoke all administrative, legislative and other measures that constitute an internationally wrongful act” or “employ all means at their disposal to reduce their GHG emissions”: at [447]-[448].

  • Duty to make reparations: causation must be established between the wrongful act of a State or group of States and particular damage suffered by the injured State or individuals to establish reparation. The appropriate nature and quantum of reparations will depend on the circumstances of the particular case: at [449].

  • Restitution: while restitution may prove difficult or unfeasible in the case of environmental harm, since such harm is often not easily reversible, where appropriate, restitution may take the form of reconstructing damaged or destroyed infrastructure and restoring ecosystems and biodiversity: at [451].

  • Compensation: where restitution proves materially impossible, responsible States have an obligation to compensate. The absence of adequate evidence for the extent of material damage will not, in itself, preclude an award of compensation for that damage: at [452], [453].

  • Satisfaction: whether satisfaction is warranted will depend on the nature and circumstances of the breach. Satisfaction may take the form of expressions of regret, formal apologies, public acknowledgments or statements, education of the society about climate change or a formal declaration by an international court or tribunal of the wrongfulness of State conduct: at [455].

The ICJ acknowledged that Small Island Developing States (SIDS) “have faced and are likely to face greater levels of climate change-related harm owing to their geographical circumstances and level of development.” Nevertheless, the Court clarified that the rules of State responsibility under customary international law apply uniformly, regardless of the category or vulnerability of the injured State. Thus, “particularly vulnerable” States, such as SIDS, are in principle entitled to the same remedies as any other injured State. The Court did not further consider the specific legal consequences for SIDS or other vulnerable groups, finding that such an assessment fell outside the scope of its Advisory Opinion: at [109]-[110].

What does the Advisory Opinion mean for businesses and the international landscape?

Clarification of State obligations

The Advisory Opinion, while not legally binding, represents a landmark clarification of States’ existing legal obligations under international law in relation to climate change. The Opinion carries significant legal and moral authority and is expected to wield influence on both the policy landscape and business environment worldwide.

The Court’s findings have clarified the breadth of States’ obligations to prevent significant harm to the climate system, including exercising rigorous due diligence based on the best available scientific evidence, implementing effective measures for both mitigation and adaptation to climate change, maintaining ambitious NDCs and co-operating in good faith, including by facilitating technology transfer and providing financial support. Importantly, these duties apply to all States, regardless of whether they are parties to specific climate treaties.

States must also assess and prevent transboundary environmental harm, be guided by human rights and environmental law and remain accountable for their actions. Failure to meet these obligations may constitute an internationally wrongful act, potentially triggering legal consequences such as cessation of the offending conduct and reparation for harm caused.

Influence on the international negotiations and policy landscape

The Advisory Opinion is likely to play a significant role in shaping forthcoming international negotiations, including those on a global plastics treaty and at COP30. By clarifying the legal obligations of States and reinforcing the principles of environmental protection and international cooperation, the Advisory Opinion is likely to empower smaller and more vulnerable nations in multilateral negotiations, strengthen collective ambition and encourage more decisive and coordinated action to address the interconnected challenges of climate change and environmental degradation.

Implications for business

Businesses operating in sectors with significant environmental footprints should anticipate increased scrutiny and the possibility of new or strengthened regulations requiring them to align their operations with evolving climate standards. Businesses are increasingly facing growing pressure from consumers, investors and stakeholders to incorporate sustainable practices within their operations, minimise their adverse impact on the environment and transition towards a low emissions future, publicly disclosing these processes.

Climate litigation

The Advisory Opinion is also expected to be influential in climate litigation, both domestically and internationally. Courts and litigants are increasingly drawing on international jurisprudence to support novel legal arguments. By clarifying the scope of States’ pre-existing obligations – including the duty to regulate private actors – the Advisory Opinion may provide further backing for legal actions not only against States but, in certain circumstances, against corporations, particularly transnational companies whose activities have had significant climate impacts.

Strategic considerations for businesses

Businesses should closely monitor developments in international law and policy and assess the potential downstream implications of the Advisory Opinion for their operations and value chains. Proactive alignment with both domestic and international climate commitments is important to mitigate regulatory and reputational risks and to demonstrate leadership in the global response to climate change.

The Advisory Opinion underscores the urgency and legal imperative for both States and businesses to take meaningful, science-based action on climate change. By anticipating and adapting to this evolving legal and policy landscape, businesses can not only ensure compliance but also contribute constructively to global climate solutions.