A pivotal moment for climate action: what to expect at COP30 in Belém

Securing climate finance for developing nations will top the COP30 agenda, as countries move from setting the NCQG targets to figuring out how to deliver them.

At COP29, Parties agreed on the NCQG - aiming to raise at least USD300 billion per year by 2035 from developed countries, replacing the old USD100 billion goal. Beyond this, Parties agreed to work toward mobilising USD1.3 trillion per year by 2035 from ‘all public and private sources’, inviting contributions from a wider set of actors (including multilateral development banks and financial institutions).

At COP30, the Presidency is tasked with delivering a ‘Baku-to-Belém Roadmap’ to detail how to scale climate financing up to the USD1.3 trillion level. This roadmap will likely explore reforms to international financial institutions, innovative funding sources (such as blended finance or climate taxes) and ways to incentivise private capital flows. We expect contentious discussions over ‘who pays and how’ to continue. Developed nations are expected to take the lead on public finance but will press for emerging economies and the private sector to contribute as well.

Loss and damage funding is a related area of focus. Developing countries had pushed to include loss and damage within the NCQG, but ultimately loss and damage was left out of the USD300 billion goal. Instead, COP30 may consider a dedicated target for adaptation and loss and damage finance.

Adaptation finance will also be a prominent issue. The COP26 pledge to at least double adaptation finance by 2025 expires this year, so pressure is mounting to adopt a new adaptation finance goal. Many developing countries are calling for tripling adaptation finance by 2030 to avoid backsliding.

With the framework for Article 6 carbon markets mostly settled at COP29 in Baku, COP30 shifts focus to implementation.

Against this backdrop, there are several mandated agenda items at COP30 in relation to Article 6 relating to environmental integrity and reporting under Article 6.2, standards and methodologies under the Article 6.4 carbon crediting mechanism (known as the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM)), funding for the administration of the PACM, and the transition away from the CDM established under the Kyoto Protocol.

In relation to Article 6.2, Parties will consider a report by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat that compiles and synthesises the results of the Article 6 technical expert review (TER) and identifies recurring themes and lessons learned. The first TER of reports by countries on their implementation of Article 6 revealed considerable shortcomings, including about ensuring environmental integrity.

In relation to Article 6.4, Parties will consider the annual report of the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body on PACM implementation and Parties will have the option of providing the Supervisory Body with additional guidance on the implementation of the mechanism. Parties will also consider phase out of the CDM, given that no agreement on this was reached at COP28 or COP29. It is important to note that, at the last two COPs, Brazil was the most vocal in supporting CDM continuation.

Since COP29, the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body has been working to approve the first carbon credit methodologies, with initial project types potentially cleared by mid-2025. The Supervisory Body has also been working on standards for safeguards including baselines, additionality, and preventing the reversal of carbon removals. While adopted by the Supervisory Body, we expect the standard on non-permanence and reversals to be a continuing point of discussion at COP30. There are widespread industry concerns over post-crediting monitoring obligations (indefinite post-crediting monitoring periods, instead of a fixed monitoring period), which are considered too burdensome for participants (especially for nature-based activities).

Article 6.8 and its framework for non-market approaches will also have its usual mandated agenda item to consider the progress of the work programme.

COP30 represents a culmination of the Paris Agreement’s five-year ambition cycle, with Parties expected to submit new or updated NDCs with 2035 targets by 2025. This will have direct consequences for negotiations on mitigation under the MWP, particularly after Parties were unable to agree to take work forward from COP28 on implementing the outcomes of the first GST at COP29.

Many major emitters have announced their 2035 targets in the lead-up to COP30. Notably:

• The UK submitted a target to cut emissions by 81% below 1990 levels by 2035.

• Brazil submitted a target to cut emissions by 59–67% below 2005 levels by 2035.

• The EU submitted a target to cut emissions 66.25–72.5% below 1990 levels by 2035.

• China submitted a target to reduce net emissions by 7–10% from peak levels by 2035 (China’s other targets are to achieve a peaking of emissions before 2030 and net zero by 2060).

• Indonesia submitted a target to achieve emissions reductions of between 1.26 to 1.49 gigatonnes, with no baseline (Indonesia’s other targets are to achieve a peaking of emission by 2030 and net zero by 2060).

• As mentioned earlier, Australia’s 2035 emissions target is to cut emissions by 62–70% below 2005 levels.

In response to the 64 new NDCs submitted by Parties before 30 September 2025, the UNFCCC Secretariat released a report synthesising the information in these NDCs (NDC Synthesis Report). Key takeaways include:

• The data cover only around 30% of total global GHG emissions in 2019.

• There are new indications of real and increasing progress on action to address climate change.

• Collectively, the new NDCs amount to a reduction in projected emissions of 17% (11-24) below 2019 levels.

• Countries are bending the combined emission curve downward, however there is a need for ‘major acceleration’ to deliver faster and deeper emission cuts.

While there is initially no mandated negotiation item for MWP on the COP30 agenda, we expect the Presidency to include mitigation on the agenda. Mitigation will also come up in other mandated forums, such as in relation to climate finance and just transition.

The MWP talks at COP29 were fraught, with disagreements over referencing the GST outcomes (like phasing down fossil fuels) leading to deadlock. A key debate will be whether COP30 should issue a political call for stronger near-term action, for example, urging countries to peak global emissions by 2025 and phase out unabated fossil fuels as part of a cover decision. How COP30 handles the 'transition away from fossil fuels' will be important to follow.

Article 7 of the Paris Agreement establishes the GGA to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability. For years, it lacked operational detail and impetus, but this is rapidly changing as the impacts of climate change intensify. The political urgency was captured by the COP30 President‑Designate, Ambassador André Corrêa do Lago:

"Without adaptation, climate change becomes a multiplier of poverty, destroying livelihoods, displacing workers, and deepening hunger. As the impacts intensify, inaction is no longer a technical failure but a political choice about who lives and who dies." 

At COP30, a final decision on the indicators of adaptation used to measure progress towards is expected. The indicators will be used to assess whether and why adaptation is happening across the world. There will also be the ability to consider enablers of adaptation such as finance.

This point has been reached after much debate. Setting adaptation indicators has been difficult because adaptation outcomes are inherently context‑specific. What constitutes resilience or reduced vulnerability varies by place, population, sector, and hazard profile, complicating efforts to standardise metrics.

At COP28, Parties adopted the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience, which articulates broad thematic targets across water, food, health, ecosystems, infrastructure, poverty cultural heritage, ‘iterative adaptation cycle’ targets covering risk assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and learning. To make the framework measurable, COP28 launched a two‑year UAE–Belém work programme to develop indicators that could track collective progress, clarifying that the indicators should be globally applicable and capped at 100. An additional ‘menu’ would be included for parties to consider adopting based on their national circumstances. A key area of contention is whether indicators should also enable measurement of means of implementation and how the Article 7 adaptation agenda interacts with Articles related to finance, technology and transparency.

COP29 also established the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR) to carry GGA implementation beyond COP30 (including a high‑level dialogue), establishing the GGA as a mandated agenda item at future COPs. Modalities for the BAR are expected to be agreed at COP30.

The coming indicator set will influence how adaptation progress is measured and compared globally. This is particularly the case when adaptation is also gaining prominence in national policy frameworks. For example, according to the NDC Synthesis Report, 73% of new NDCs include an adaptation component. Parties can expect increasing emphasis on aligning National Adaptation Plans and NDCs with the GGA indicator architecture, including reporting on enabling factors.

As mentioned earlier, adaptation finance will also be a key issue. The COP26 pledge to at least double adaptation finance by 2025 expires at the end of this year, with many developing countries calling for a tripling of adaptation finance by 2030 to avoid backsliding. A decision on adaptation finance would support the implementation of adaptation and inform progress towards the GGA.

2024 marked the first deadline for Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) under the Paris Agreement’s Enhanced Transparency Framework, with all countries due to submit their climate progress reports by the end of 2024 and every two years thereafter. BTRs form part of the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF). The reports are intended to provide information on:

• National inventory reports.

• Progress towards NDCs.

• Policies and measures.

• Climate change impacts and adaptation.

• Levels of financial, technology development and transfer and capacity-building support.

• Capacity-building needs and areas of improvement.

At COP30, the quality and timeliness of these reports will come into focus. Parties will discuss how to address gaps. For example, many developing countries struggled to submit BTRs on time due to capacity constraints, so we expect to see calls for support and flexibility to ensure no country is lagging on reporting.

Additionally, we anticipate that COP30 may refine transparency rules based on the first BTR experiences. Topics could include standardising methodologies for tracking greenhouse gas inventories and NDC progress and improving the Article 6 reporting formats (since carbon credit trading adds complexity to accounting). The Paris Agreement transparency framework likely filter down into domestic policy, so these developments are important to follow.

COP29 concluded without an agreement on the JTWP, highlighting significant divisions between developed and developing countries and the ultimate focus on NCQG negotiations. COP30 is expected to advance this discussion, potentially by establishing a more concrete work or action plan for the JTWP. In addition, we expect that COP30 will see a renewed focus on securing commitments made in respect of renewable energy and energy efficiency, along with the contentious issue of transitioning away from fossil fuels.

The key issues raised that will inform just transition discussions moving forward are the challenges of:

• Replacing economic dependence on fossil fuels for developing nations cannot be understated.

• Creating whole new sectors of the economy in the limited period required to achieve the net zero transition.

• Obtaining fair access to capital, trade agreements and deployment of technology.

• Offering clear frameworks and guidance that allow nations to define their own just transition pathways in the context of sustainable development and eradication of poverty.

• Protecting vulnerable communities from climate impacts.

COP30 will shine a spotlight on the nexus between climate change and biodiversity, building on recent developments in both the UN climate and biodiversity processes.

At COP29 Baku, negotiators explicitly acknowledged this ‘important nexus’ and committed to continue discussions on biodiversity within the climate talks. The Azerbaijan Presidency even launched a COP29 Declaration on Water for Climate Action, linking water security to climate goals. Brazil is uniquely positioned to elevate these issues at COP30. We anticipate initiatives focused on forests and nature-based solutions for climate mitigation and adaptation. For instance, increased support for halting deforestation by a certain date or bolstering finance for forest conservation (including through the launch of the Tropical Forest Forever Facility).

Integration of nature will likely come through joint commitments and cross-convention collaboration. Parties may discuss how the climate convention can work together with the Convention on Biological Diversity. We could see more proposals to incorporate nature-based climate solutions in countries’ NDCs or to use climate finance to achieve co-benefits for ecosystems.

Our review of the work being done to revise and update NDCs demonstrates that countries are increasingly seeing nature-based solutions and/or ecosystem-based approaches as key solutions to climate change mitigation, adaptation and disaster reduction. We also expect that nature and biodiversity will be relevant to discussions on climate finance and Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.

Australia approaches COP30 as an active middle power player with a clear set of priorities. According to the Australian Government, key objectives include:

• Delivering clean energy transition.

• Further reducing global emissions.

• Strengthening adaptation efforts.

• Mobilising resources for climate finance.

• Unlocking investment in clean energy solutions for Australia and our region.

Many of these priorities reflect areas where Australia has taken on leadership roles. Notably, Australian Climate Change Minister Chris Bowen served as co-chair of the NCQG negotiations in 2024, alongside Egypt’s minister.

Australia will remain heavily involved in shaping the USD1.3 trillion finance roadmap and will be among the countries expected to significantly contribute to climate finance, politically and financially. We will be watching for any announcements of increased climate finance commitments (for example, contributions to the Green Climate Fund, Loss and Damage Fund or Pacific Resilience Facility) during COP30 as a signal of intent from Parties.

On mitigation ambition, Australia’s strategic interest lies in global peer pressure matching its own stepped-up ambition. Having announced a 2035 target of 62–70% cut (up from 43% by 2030), the Australian delegation will press major emitters to likewise enhance their targets so that Australian industries are not competitively disadvantaged. This aligns with Australia’s positioning in coalitions like the High Ambition Coalition. However, this is a difficult line for Australia to walk given its continued dependence on fossil fuels. Turkey’s objection to Australia hosting COP31 cited Australia’s large fossil fuel industry. To counter such criticism and bolster its credibility, Australia may back calls at COP30 for phasing down unabated coal power (like policies Australia is implementing domestically).

Another strategic focus is supporting the Pacific region’s priorities. At COP30, we expect Australia to echo Pacific calls for strong adaptation funding and loss and damage support. This not only is morally and diplomatically important for Canberra’s ties with the Pacific, but it also dovetails with Australia’s bid to host COP31 as a ‘Pacific COP’. Demonstrating solidarity with Pacific nations at COP30 by advocating their initiative for a global climate finance overhaul or spotlighting issues like climate-induced displacement will strengthen Australia’s leadership credentials.

What happens at COP30 will significantly shape the trajectory into next year and beyond.

COP30’s outcomes can unlock substantial opportunities in Australia’s clean economy transition. Australian companies in renewable energy, clean technology and sustainable infrastructure need to be ready to tap into new capital flows for green projects globally. For instance, if the COP30 roadmap calls for scaling up private climate finance, it may spur initiatives like green bonds, blended finance facilities, or de-risking instruments that Australian banks and investors can participate in or even lead.

A strong integration of nature at COP30 can also open nature-based markets in Australia. If global investors commit billions to nature-based solutions, Australia could attract a share of that investment with its existing carbon and nature markets. Businesses that manage land or rely on ecosystem services may find new revenue streams in conservation finance or payment for ecosystem services schemes encouraged by international frameworks.